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“The New Interpol is not simply a collection of databases and 
communication networks,” said Secretary General Ronald K. Noble to 
national representatives at Interpol’s 2002 annual assembly.1 “You have 
heard me use the expression—the Interpol police family. It is an 
expression that we wish to turn into reality” (Noble 2002). The 
organization, dedicated to police cooperation, had previously taken four to 
six months to transmit even high-profile requests for arrest between 
member nations. Notices were sent as photocopies, mailed by the cheapest 
and lowest priority postage available (ibid.).2 Modernization and 
reorganization, however, had just cut the time for priority notices to a 
single day. The Secretary General’s call for “police family” named the 
organization’s ambition to create fellowship through these exchanges. 
Interpol is not a police force. Neither national nor international laws 
are enforced by Interpol directly, nor do staff and seconded police officers 
working under its name make a state’s claim to the right of physical 
coercion (vide Weber), or to powers of investigation and arrest. Policing, 
however, depends on vast numbers of people—“media liaison offices, 
environmental scanning units, quality assurance teams, community 
involvement teams, criminal intelligence specialists”—who spend their 
time on “knowledge work” (Sheptycki 1998, 59). Much of policing 
consists of “processing and exchanging knowledge about crime and 
insecurity” (ibid.); at Interpol, knowledge work is the primary activity. 
A measure of contemporary life is assimilated and translated into 
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police information: personal documents, bodies, records of international 
travel, court decisions, cyber consumption. Enabled by data technology, 
Interpol increasingly has been able to find and fill niches in the 
complicated apparatus of global police cooperation, which is partly, but 
not wholly, international.3 Operating in relation to sovereign nations and 
their many law enforcement agencies, as well as transnational 
corporations, nongovernmental movements, the United Nations and the 
Group of Eight, criminal networks, and other shapers of security and 
insecurity today, “global” does not mean everywhere, but anywhere 
within those relations. Interpol tries to produce a shared policing ethos 
through meetings, conferences, and train-the-trainer initiatives, but the 
delimiting feature of global policing is not an occupational “culture” of 
police, bureaucratic autonomy, or the emergence of a new transnational 
police subculture. Rather, global policing develops out of a distinct blend 
of legal tools, justifications based on shared needs and goals, and 
concerted cooperation within a human and technological assemblage. 
These elements shape flows of information and expertise. Standard 
procedures change, and new practices are made possible. Regulated by 
multilateral and bilateral agreements, personal and political bonds are 
created with Interpol, and between law enforcement in different countries. 
Interpol’s primary services concern information. Among the most used are 
storing and providing access to nominal data for known international 
criminals, missing persons, unidentified bodies, and stolen identity 
documents; and its system of notices. 
Global policing at Interpol came about not through a happenstance of 
technology and history, but by a designed, narrow orientation to function 
that let it escape much of the friction that beset such institutions as the 
United Nations (Russell 1965). Interpol uses the existing laws within 
countries, even where diplomatic relations do not exist between them, in 
order to operate “as though” understandings of crime and the designation 
of criminals were universal (INTERPOL 1956, Art. 2). Of course they are 
not, as requests for political asylum, the designation of terrorist 
organizations, espionage, and drone killings, among other examples, make 
evident. “[L]ittle difficulty is encountered in the mere statement of the 
rights,” wrote Richard Mckeon (1948b, 180), an advisor on the draft- ing 
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which Interpol adapted 
into its constitution in 1956. “The differences are found rather in what is 
meant by these rights” (ibid.). McKeon pointed to two paths for dealing 
with the problem of differences: actual philosophic agreement, or that 
failing, as historically it has, “a political frame may be sought within 
which agreement is possible concerning common action toward common 
ends” (ibid., 181). Interpol operates without attempting to establish 
explicit consensus on the philosophic base of its actions, instead getting 
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participants to agree to regulations and accompanying practices. 
In this chapter I show how global policing has found ways of acting 
through the vast array of law and law enforcement mechanisms around the 
world, in a noteworthy experiment in developing a frame for common 
action. Predominantly through Interpol’s role in the circulation of 
information, it enters into relationships in which all parties are inflected 
and shaped. In the process, it has helped to transform the “flexible security 
apparatus” (Noble 2009)4 of police cooperation, and hence aspects of 
governance, from the local to national, regional, and global. The chapter 
draws on time spent as an intern at the General Secretariat, as well as 
Interpol publications, news stories, and interviews with staff, to discuss its 
history, institutional structure, and daily practices. Three cases are 
presented, dealing with Red Notices, national sovereignty, and terrorism, 
through which I explore some of the problems arising in Interpol’s 
political and technical operating arrangements. In conclusion I compare 
international and global policing schematically and examine Interpol’s 
attempts to give institutional and procedural direction to its still-evolving 
form of policing. 
 
April 2007, Lyon, France 
My attendance at one of Interpol’s big annual meetings was a fluke. 
Throughout the spring of 2007, the bioterrorism program at Interpol, 
where I was an intern, had been trying to get member countries to respond 
to a questionnaire about the status of their domestic legislation on 
bioterrorism. In April, representatives from each member’s National 
Central Bureau (NCB) gathered at the General Secretariat in Lyon, France, 
to hear updates and proposals about routine governance. The “Heads of 
NCBs” meeting, of which this was the third, was also an opportunity to 
socialize in an informal manner, in order to establish personal bonds and 
create networks. 
The return rate on the bioterrorism questionnaire had been dismally 
low, and in a last-ditch effort, the coordinator of the program decided to 
have his assistants distribute paper copies at the meeting and then stand 
around smiling to collect them. The secretary, a program assistant, and I 
were given security passes, which were required even though we worked 
at the headquarters, and together we trucked over to the conference 
auditorium, located at the other end of the tidily landscaped stretch of 
modern buildings called the Cité Internationale. We arrived just before 
our boss was scheduled to give his 15-minute presentation to the massive 
assembly. However, as it turned out, the meeting was running two hours 
late, and so we settled in to watch the presentations, already in progress. 
The meeting’s overly dramatic security—such as the need for us to 
Stalcup, M. 2013. “Interpol and the Emergence of Global Policing.”  
 
234 
have passes—was typical of Interpol. Nothing would happen or be 
revealed that required the meeting to be closed to the press, let alone to 
already vet- ted employees. The representatives engaged in posturing that 
emphasized their putatively equal status, but that would be familiar to 
anyone who has watched proceedings at the United Nations. 
Conspicuously polite salutations were followed by a business-like 
approach to checking off agenda items. The only surprise might be the 
directness of interactions. At one point someone’s retirement was 
announced, and from the middle of the audience of Interpol heads from 
around the world came the request that, before the retiree departed for 
good, a query to the stolen vehicles database be fast-tracked. Seeming out 
of scale in the giant auditorium, the request unsubtly made the point to all 
in attendance that the query had not yet been answered. 
At this sort of meeting, secret information or the details of operations 
would never be discussed, since revealing such things would be a security 
breach if heard by other national representatives at the assembly, as much 
as if heard by the press or other attendees, such as myself. But Interpol 
uses its mystique and a certain dose of ostentatious security as a tool of 
publicity, an argument to the effect that it holds secrets and therefore must 
be important. When the organization moved from Paris to Lyon in 1989, it 
built new shiny headquarters in the shape of a fortress with a moat, a 
façade for the mundane French bureaucracy inside. A moat is not a 
discrete way to ensure security; it rather draws attention to the need for 
security, which was real enough given that the move from Paris came after 
a 1986 terrorist attack on the organization. The moat was subsequently 
drained (it turned out to attract mosquitoes) and the everyday business of 
Interpol is staid. The decorum is to be expected, given that no one is put to 
the adrenaline- pumping test of frontline law enforcement, and half the 
staff are in fact lawyers. The discrepancy between day-to-day work and 
the stirring press releases on Interpol’s website fed a rumor among 
employees of five secret underground levels, staffed round the clock with 
furiously typing liaisons who are piped espresso and hot meals from the 
other side of the Rhone. 
As we settled into the meeting, I fiddled with the headphones that 
provided simultaneous translation in Interpol’s four official languages, 
English, French, Spanish, and Arabic. The pair I had didn’t work, and I 
went back to get a second, and then clicked through the channels, on all of 
which a female voice moved smoothly in unison with the voices coming 
over the auditorium loudspeakers. Secretary General Noble, a lawyer and 
former Undersecretary for Enforcement in the US Treasury Department, 
and Jean-Michel Louboutin, the Executive Director of Police Services, 
formerly with the French National Police, were seated at a table on the 
stage, assisted by a subdirectorate head. The lighting on the platform, 
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bottom-center, was dramatic, leaving in relative darkness the upward- 
sweeping seats filled with career cops from 187 members. (By 2012, the 
number had increased to 190, out of the world’s 195 nations. North Korea 
and Taiwan are among the few nonparticipants). As one speaker after 
another presented at the podium, a live feed of the proceedings was 
projected on a giant screen hung above the stage. 
 
Interpol’s Legal Status 
The historical development of law enforcement cooperation has been 
ably documented;5 some elements of that history are central to the 
evolution of Interpol’s legal status, and to debates over global “policing.” 
Heads of state and security in Europe were first swayed by the 
Revolutions of 1848 to strengthen and professionalize policing practices. 
Uniformed police brigades were stationed in principal cities in order to be 
able to deal with riots and insurrections (Liang 1992, 10), leading to what 
Silver (2005) called “policed societies,” in which the police were 
organized to flexibly respond to crime—or political agitators—on an as-
needed basis. After the revolutions, European governments increasingly 
agreed that they needed to coordinate their efforts against political 
dissenters (Jensen 2004). They were influenced in part by widespread 
fears of a vast anarchist– terrorist conspiracy, although those who 
committed the acts of violence were often unaffiliated with the formal 
anarchism movements. The 1890s came to be called the “Decade of 
Regicide” (ibid.), as self-described or alleged anarchists successfully 
assassinated presidents, prime ministers, and monarchs. Perhaps as 
influential, however, were “dynamitings,” both threatened and enacted, 
which were widely publicized by the then-new mass media, and spread 
the impression that “violence previously reserved for soldiers, policemen 
and unpopular politicians” was being visited upon common citizens 
(Jensen 1981). In this situation, the “high police” charged with policing 
political activities (Brodeur 1983) and the “low” or “order” police of 
common crimes (Liang 1992) concurred that cross-border threats were 
grave. Their united voices were persuasive in organizing support for 
international police cooperation, despite tensions between the European 
governments on other issues (Jensen 1981). 
The first International Criminal Congress in 1914 was convened by 
Dr. Johann Schober, head of the Vienna police, and Prince Albert of 
Monaco. The range of mechanized travel was increasing, and with it, 
escapes from justice. The conveners hoped to organize international police 
cooperation for criminal matters such as extradition. The lack of a pro- 
cedure had been highlighted the year before when the perpetrator of the 
high-profile theft of Austria’s imperial jewels was found and detained, but 
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there was no legal process available for getting the jewels, and the thief, 
back to Vienna (Gerspacher 2008, 174). The 1914 Congress created a 
draft agreement for cross-border police cooperation, but efforts to get it 
signed were interrupted by World War I. Interpol was officially founded 
after the war, in 1923, using the text of the earlier draft, with a mandate to 
sup- port and assist “all organizations, authorities and services whose 
mission is to prevent or combat international crime” (Interpol 2010c). 
During World War II the Nazis co-opted the organization. At the end of 
that war, Interpol reformed, moved headquarters to France, and in 1956 
passed a new constitution binding itself in spirit, although not yet an any 
practical or technocratic fashion, to the heady goals of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights. 
Interpol was plagued for many years by accusations of illegitimacy 
because it was not founded on the basis of an international treaty.6 When 
the organization declared itself into existence in 1923, the voting had been 
done by law enforcement delegates from 20 countries rather than 
diplomatic representatives explicitly endowed with the powers of negotia- 
tion (Naím and Kendall 2001). Interpol backdoored itself into recognition 
by persuading the League of Nation to name it as the official “agency of 
fulfillment” for the 1929 Convention on Currency Counterfeiting, an 
arena in which Interpol had considerable expertise (Fooner 1989, 52). 
Getting named in a supra-national, international document “amounted to a 
de facto recognition by the highest international political authority at that 
time” (ibid.). Several subsequent European conventions strength- ened 
this claim to legitimacy by including a provision that required using 
“Interpol’s organization for specific elements of their mandates” (ibid.). 
Interpol applied to the UN for the status of Non-Governmental Organi- 
zation, which was granted in 1948, and then in 1971 it made a special 
arrangement with the UN to be treated as if it were an Intergovernmental 
Organization, a higher status category than Non-Governmental Organi- 
zation. This was described by one prominent international lawyer as “in 
effect, a treaty between the two organizations” (Sheptycki 2004, 120). 
Interpol was hounded by detractors over the following decades. Much 
of its struggle can be traced to a smear campaign by the Church of 
Scientology. Church founder and then-leader Ron Hubbard was conduct- 
ing business from his yacht on the high seas in order to avoid national 
legal and tax jurisdictions, leading multiple countries that were 
investigating the church for fraud as early as 1957 to ask for assistance 
from Interpol (Fooner 1989, 12–15). By the 1970s, Scientologists were 
retaliating with a surveil- lance, investigation, and negative publicity 
crusade to discredit and impede the policing organization. The fallout 
from their attacks included lengthy United States congressional inquiries 
and lawsuits, as well as a pervasive public legacy of, if not disrepute, at 




In a less aggressive although persistent manner, academics have ques- 
tioned if Interpol’s originary agreement, between representatives who 
seemingly were not endowed with the power to sign treaties, is legitimate. 
International seems to suggest diplomatic agreements between nations, 
which goes some way to explaining why Interpol has been viewed as sus- 
pect, and lends a certain irony to its name (ICPO–INTERPOL, where the 
official abbreviation “ICPO” stands for International Criminal Police 
Organization). A law scholar who led the Office of Legal Affairs at 
Interpol, Rutsel Martha, has argued that the question of Interpol’s 
legitimacy properly comes down to “how to establish whether the 
consensus of wills reflected in Interpol’s Constitution can be attributed to 
the countries of those officers who participated in its adoption and 
continue to participate in its activities” (2010, 151). Precedent exists, he 
argues, for “even the procès-verbal of an international conference [to] 
form an adequate record of an informal agreement” (ibid., 150–151). 
Several factors, he suggests, indicate that Interpol’s representatives did 
represent the will of their countries, both at the 1923 founding and in 1956 
when the new Constitution was created, and this is annually reconfirmed 
by statutory contributions.7 Signatures authorizing attendance were 
provided by national secretaries and ministers whose responsibilities 
included international law enforcement cooperation (ibid., 164). New 
membership in Interpol must be submitted to and approved by the 
appropriate governmental authority. 
Member states in the United Nations have an obligation to register 
treaties and international agreements with the UN Secretariat, which in 
turn is mandated to publish them. The Secretariat examines each 
instrument to “satisfy itself that it, prima facie, constitutes a treaty 
between entities possessing treaty-making capacity, and, whatever its 
form, imposes on the parties legal obligations binding under international 
law” (Michel 2011). In March of 2008, Martha, acting as the General 
Counsel in Interpol’s Office of Legal Affairs, wrote to the United Nations 
to request a ruling on whether Interpol’s Constitution qualified for 
registration and publication. After review, the Under-Secretary for Legal 
Affairs of the UN, Nicholas Michel, noted that whether the Constitution 
had been intended as a formal treaty was less relevant than the character it 
had acquired over the years, and that there was no doubt that Interpol was 
today recognized as an international organization (Michel 2011). 
Following Michel’s suggestion, at Interpol’s 2011 General Assembly 
representatives adopted a resolution agreeing that Interpol’s constitution 
should be considered an international agreement (a treaty), and voted in 
favor of submitting the Constitution for publication by the United Nations 
(INTERPOL 2011). Publication would enter Interpol’s constitution into 
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the permanent UN record as a treaty, and provide the highest level of legal 
confirmation available that it is an intergovernmental organization.8 
 
The Global Form of Policing 
Given the state-centric connotations of “international,” transnational 
policing has been the preferred term among scholars for sub-state or even 
more micro-level cross-border law enforcement. Transnationalization, 
according to Sheptycki, “attempts to understand action on the global stage 
by reference to state action as it is conditioned by non-state factors and 
processes in world politics” (Sheptycki 2000, 6). Sheptycki criticizes 
globalization discourses that characterize “the newly emergent world 
order as one where states have been disempowered and wholly 
subordinated to the power of transnational capital” (ibid.). Indeed, 
“globalization” has been posited as the decline of the state or as Bruce 
Kapferer notes, there is “a tendency to oppose globalization to the state 
rather than concentrating on the new state formations that are emerging 
within globalizing processes and, indeed, are integral to it” (2005, 287). 
An alternative understanding of globalization is needed to make sense of 
both old and new relationships, events, and processes. 
Collier and Ong describe globalization through the range of 
phenomena that present its changes, and suggest that there are “global 
forms” to be found. These phenomena can be abstracted from the 
particular situations in which they manifest, without that abstraction 
requiring or suggesting a more general theory about globalization. They 
are “limited or delimited by specific technical infrastructures, 
administrative apparatuses, or value regimes, not by the vagaries of a 
social or cultural field” (Collier and Ong 2004, 11). As global forms 
articulate in specific situations, or “territorialize” to become assemblages, 
they are able “to assimilate themselves to new environments, to code 
heterogeneous contexts and objects in terms that are amenable to control 
and valuation” and to “define new material, collective, and discursive 
relationships” (ibid., 4). Transnational police cooperation is constituted by 
security actors drawn from public and private, local and national, and 
identifiable—although still mutable—legal, technological, and political 
elements. If some police actions are understood to occur through the 
relationships between these actors and elements, the question can then be 
raised as to which should be properly considered “global.” 
Valverde and Mopas emphasize “the persistently, unfashionably non- 
global character of much policing, even of supposedly international polic- 
ing” (2004, 236). “[T]he number of international covenants or agreements 
conferring international powers on police is exactly zero,” they remind 
readers, and for multiple reasons, “States and local municipalities remain 
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the key venues for, and jurisdictions of, law enforcement” (ibid.). They 
conclude that Interpol is therefore “a fancy ‘policeman’s club’ ” (ibid., 
248) for professional contacts or an organization, “comparable to 
international organizations of academics” (ibid., 236). Friendly sociality 
was not the whole story even in the past though, and the Secretary 
General’s aspira- tional appeal for police family suggests that it has not 
manifested fulsomely either. More germanely, Interpol was not designed 
to act as a scaled-up version of local policing. Interpol has changed and 
assimilated itself into heterogeneous contexts of action, from partnerships 
with International Criminal Tribunals and an array of United Nations 
entities, to direct access by border control, thus connecting and shaping 
such practices as well as creating new kinds of venues. 
Bowling and Sheptycki, quite differently, emphasize universality. 
They define global policing as “the capacity to use coercive and 
surveillant powers around the world in ways that pass right through 
national boundaries unaffected by them” (2012, 8). Yet no matter how 
powerfully those capac- ities enable traditional police activities such as 
surveillance, detention, and arrest, the political and socio-cultural milieus 
within which the acts are carried out produce differentiation and impart 
limits. The technical infrastructure and administrative apparatus provided 
by such organizations as Interpol are not passively received, but actively 
adapted to local practice within specific legal regimes. 
Interpol’s innovations in services to member nations, related to com- 
piling data and making that data accessible, are taken up and put to use in 
different ways. Face-to-face contact between officers, groups with a spe- 
cialized crime focus, regional encounters, and materials spreading “best 
practices” are productive not because they foster a new subculture of 
transnational police, or because they displace national sovereignty (they 
may in fact advance its exercise), but because they create relationships 
and flows of information that were not there before. The adaptation of 
these technological and human capacities into specific, local forms of 
actions are what can be considered the “global” part of policing. 
 
Global Policing at Interpol 
Where the technology is in place, frontline officers can access 
Interpol’s databases from their patrol cars, as well as at airports and 
borders. How- ever, in much of the world, the cooperation Interpol 
facilitates is between officers at the National Central Bureaus and the 
General Secretariat; or between officers and non-law enforcement 
working on a shared topic, such as counterfeiting. Notably, Interpol itself 
is acting as an interface. Gerspacher observes that in the 1990s, national 
governments became increasingly fond of the idea of international police 
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cooperation, while police at the local level resisted forming partnerships 
with unknown col- leagues across borders (2008, 180). The effect of 
Interpol’s structure in terms of user experience is therefore, appropriately, 
that Interpol is not merely the intermediary; rather, Interpol is the direct 
partner, and nations depositing information are one step removed from 
each other. Countries will only enter and use information when a degree 
of trust exists, if not in each other, at least in the safeguards on data 
sharing and processes of verification. This system means that the 
relationship is formed, most immediately, with Interpol. 
Making professional contacts, however, is a benefit for those 
“seconded” to headquarters. The Director of Specialized Crime when I 
was there, a career Royal Canadian Mounted Police officer, told me, “one 
of the challenges of Interpol is to work with people from so many cultures, 
but if they get one thing from this, it might be the human connections. My 
deputy was a guy from India who will now go and be the Inspector 
General of India, which means all the cops in India will answer to him. 
And in the future when I need something, I can call up and say, ‘hey, 
remember when you were here? And by the way, I need this and this 
done.’ So people volunteer for this assignment, and if they want to really 
use it well, they go home with a pocketful of business cards.” The 
emphasis on establishing contacts seemed to be partly because the 
opportunities for other benefits, such as developing new areas of expertise, 
were greatly diminished by the structure of seconding. Many police 
officers pass through Interpol on a three-year assignment. They are 
uprooted, often with their families, and need a period to readjust, as well 
as settle into new duties that often have nothing to do with their expertise 
back home. A manager told me he considered himself lucky to get six 
solid months of work from those he supervised in the middle of their stints. 
Therefore, the relationships formed may constitute a more substantive 
legacy of the experience than participating in the global circulation of 
police information, although the latter may consume the bulk of officer 
time. 
The various technologies of information sharing are what create 
institutional bridges, however. Interpol’s Stolen & Lost Travel Document 
database holds reports of missing passports, which it is in the process of 
being made widely available in real-time to border officials. When Qatar’s 
NCB Doha integrated the database into its immigration checkpoints, so 
that line officers could check entering individuals, their queries totaled 7.5 
million in the first year (INTERPOL 2010b). Other databases include 
Stolen Works of Art, Fingerprints, DNA Profiles, one for ballistics data, 
and, as mentioned by the questioner in the annual meeting, Stolen Motor 
Vehicles. 
Interpol’s color-coded Notices, which it began emitting in 1946, are 
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its best known information sharing service. They transmit data such as a 
missing or discovered person (yellow), a warning about someone’s 
criminal activities (green); or even a modus operandi (purple). Legally, 
the General Secretariat issues these notices, but in practice, they are put 
online as temporary publications by a National Central Bureau, as well as 
option- ally to the public, and then reviewed by the General Secretariat’s 
Office of Legal Affairs (Interpol 2012a, 31). A “diffusion” is similar in 
content but legally different; it is published by a National Central Bureau, 
and can be sent exclusively to one or more Bureau without informing the 
General Secretariat. The use of both types of missives dramatically 
increased with the introduction of the online I-Link system. At the end of 
2011, there were 40,886 active Notices in circulation, and 48,310 
Diffusions (Interpol 2012b). 
The best-known advisory is the Red Notices, which constitute what 
the press often calls, simplistically, an international “most wanted” list. 
Red Notices request the detention or arrest of an individual for 
extraditable offenses. Personal identifiers and judicial data must be 
supplied by the justice system of a member nation, or an international 
entity with appropriate powers. By acting as each other’s proxies, nations 
functionally extend warrants across borders, although detention, arrest, 
and, separately, extradition, are subject to review by the country in which 
the wanted individual is located. The process is also subject to any 
bilateral agreements that exist between a requestor country and a receiving 
country. 
As we waited at the “heads of NCBs” meeting in April of 2007, 
Martin Cox, the Assistant Director of Interpol’s Fugitive Investigative 
Support unit, gave a presentation on fugitive investigations, and the 
problems and challenges of Notices. Notices and diffusions can be more 
controversial than they might seem at first glance—who doesn’t want 
missing persons found or criminals caught and impeded from harming 
others? But “crimes” may be part of political protest, thus outside of 
Interpol’s purview and protected in most countries. Although a crime may 
meet the standard of double or dual criminality, i.e. it is a crime in both 
countries, the charges in a notice may be trumped-up. There are, in fact, 
well-documented cases in which Notices have been abused to persecute 
political refugees (Johnston 2012).9 In sum, a Notice can constitute an 
attempt to use the Interpol system to deprive someone of liberty, when 
that person actually needs protection (Lewis 2011). 
Cox discussed with the assembly less grave, but probably more 
pervasive, problems. Many of the difficulties that National Central 
Bureaus have with notices, he told the assembly, are simply administrative. 
Notice forms are sometimes filled out incorrectly. Other times, they are 
correct but incomplete. Many bureaus lack expertise in how to use the 
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notices, he said, or have translation problems. Another issue is what he 
described as a huge imbalance between countries in the number of 
requests submitted; essentially there are countries that use notices and 
countries that do not. 
After Cox’s presentation, a lively debate ensued, in which it became 
evident that nuances of the procedures for notices were unclear. Portugal 
argued that there was no real difference between a “diffusion” and a Red 
Notice. “The information is the same,” said the Portuguese representative. 
Noble corrected him, saying that there was a huge difference: any country 
can issue a diffusion of information to whomever it wants, without 
requirements or restrictions on language or format, whereas the General 
Secretariat must review notices. However, the ability of Interpol do this 
vetting, which as recently as 2008 was a point of pride, has been 
compromised by the massive increase in notices that came with the 
introduction of the I-Link system. Members are required to ensure that 
data they submit complies with the rules, and an advisory group 
subsequently checks their validity, although not their accuracy (Cheah 
2012, 385–87). 
The representative from Senegal asked, “is a member country allowed 
to oppose the issuance of a Red Notice?” Cox answered, “yes, the legal 
office does a review and may try to bring the countries into agreement, but 
also no, the country won’t necessarily be informed.” Secretary General 
Noble added, “It is our presumption that a country requesting a Red 
Notice is acting in accord with Interpol policy,” although as the next 
section shows, philosophic divergences may “lead to differences and 
difficulties in interpretation” (McKeon 1990, 49). 
 
“Wanted by Interpol” 
Somewhat awkwardly for Interpol, in August 2009 Iranian president 
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad nominated General Ahmad Vahidi for the 
position of Minister of Defense (BBC News 2009). Ahmadinejad had 
recently been at the center of world news after violently suppressing 
protests over his election, and the general was doubly useful to him. One, 
Vahidi had long been in the employ of Iranian defense. Two, his anti-
imperialist credentials were enhanced by being on Interpol’s Red Notice 
“wanted list,” —Argentina having issued a warrant for his arrest that was 
circulated to law enforcement around the globe (ibid.). Vahidi had come 
to be the subject of a Red Notice through neither carelessness nor lack of 
over- sight on Interpol’s part; his was one the few cases to go all the way 
through Interpol’s dispute resolution process in order to be placed on that 
list. 
In 2003, the Argentine National Central Bureau in Buenos Aires 
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requested that red notices be circulated for 12 individuals, some of whom 
were Iranian government officials (INTERPOL 2007a). The Iranian 
Bureau in Tehran promptly disputed the request. The wanted men were 
accused of directing Hezbollah to carry out a 1994 bombing in Buenos 
Aires, which had destroyed the seven-floor Israeli-Argentine Mutual 
Association (AMIA), killing 85 people and injuring around 300 more 
(BBC News 2006). Described as one of the most deadly attacks on Jews 
since World 
War II, investigation into the incident was plagued by corruption on 
the part of Argentine authorities. The improprieties were systemic and, 
eventually, well documented. One video showed the investigating judge 
offering $400,000 to a key witness. The judge countered that it was for the 
witness to protect himself, because he had admitted complicity and 
implicated others (Abiad 2006). In 2009, charges would be brought 
against former Argentine president Carlos Menem, his brother, the judge, 
and multiple other officials for obstructing the investigation and 
protecting suspects (Sullivan 2010). With so many instances of 
misconduct, Iran had solid grounds for its objections to the Red Notices 
for its nationals. 
Indeed, the first Iranian challenge was upheld. In accordance with 
Interpol’s procedures, the Executive Committee was asked to evaluate the 
conflict between the Buenos Aires and Tehran Bureaus, and they rejected 
the Red Notices in light of an Argentine court’s own conclusion that 
investigating Judge Juan José Galeano had committed “substantial 
violations of the rules of due process” and “irregular and illegal actions” 
(INTERPOL 2005). NCB Buenos Aires appealed, but in a 2005 vote, the 
74th General Assembly “overwhelmingly endorsed the Executive 
Committee’s decision to cancel the Red Notices” (ibid.). The Executive 
Committee advised that for a notice to be issued, new warrants by a 
different judge would be necessary. In Argentina, alongside the 
investigation into irregularities, further investigation and sifting of 
information about the attack took place. 
Ahmad Vahidi at the time of the AMIA bombing was the head of al- 
Quds, a special forces branch of the Iranian Defense that operates abroad. 
Through a combination of testimony, documentation of cell phone calls 
from the Brazil–Paraguay–Argentina tri-border area, country entries, and 
bank account records, evidence was brought together to allege that Vahidi 
had participated in and approved of the decision to attack AMIA during a 
meeting on August 14, 1993, and that other Iranian government officials, 
as well as Hezbollah members, had been involved (Sturcke 2009). 
This was not, to be clear, an investigation by Interpol but by 
Argentine authorities. Warrants for Ahmad Vahidi, former president 
Hashemi Rafsanjani, six other Iranians, and one Lebanese national were 
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issued by an Argentine judge in November 2006 (Berri 2006). Interpol’s 
Office of Legal Affairs approved six of the nine requested notices 
(INTERPOL 2007a). National Central Bureau Tehran challenged the 
requests on the grounds that the warrants were “politically motivated” and 
based on “unfounded and undocumented charges” (Noble 2007). After 
reviewing written sub- missions and oral presentations from both 
countries’ NCBs, the Executive Committee upheld the recommendation of 
the Office of Legal Affairs (INTERPOL 2007a). Iran maintained its 
objections. Again, the case went to the General Assembly, in which all 
member nations vote, and this time, the member nations voted to approve 
the notices (INTERPOL 2007b). 
The international objections to Vahidi’s nomination, which referred to 
the accusations that had landed him on the list, as well as his status as a 
man “wanted by Interpol” (Slackman 2009), were credited with 
strengthening his credentials with the Iranian parliament and helping the 
subsequent approval of his candidacy (Sturcke 2009). 
Another case was that of Kazakhstan’s former prime minister, 
Akezhan Kazhegeldin, who became an opposition figure to President 
Nursultan Nazarbayev’s government, which has been widely accused of 
human rights violations (Human Rights Watch 2012; US Department of 
State 2012); and characterized as a dictatorship (Norman 2011; Stodghill 
2006). In 1999, a Red Notice requested by the Kazakh National Bureau 
resulted in Kazhegeldin’s detention in Russia, and then again in 2000 in 
Italy, although in both instances he was released because the Kazakh 
general prosecutor failed to produce sufficient evidence. A third attempt, 
this time with terrorism charges, was caught by the Office of Legal 
Affairs, which revoked the notice. The revocation was upheld by a 
unanimous Executive Committee. Upon appeal in 2002, however, the 
General Assembly gave its approval, and the Red Notice was sent out and 
posted on the Interpol website, where it remains (Savino 2010, 48). 
By the standards of Interpol’s Office of Legal Affairs, and Executive 
Committee, the General Assembly made an erroneous decision about 
Kazhegeldin. No reasons were given for the vote against Interpol’s own 
legal judgment (INTERPOL 2002), although Nazarbayev, who wields 
power over considerable energy resources in a country seen as a necessary 
partner for economic and regional stability, and against Islamic extremism 
(Nichol 2012), enjoys favor among powerful politicians in many nations 
(Stodghill 2006). The outcome suggests that representatives, charged with 
advancing the law enforcement interests of their own nations, cannot 
consistently constitute an apolitical neutral body. Yet the final 
determination about whether a Red Notice will be issued rests with the 
majority vote of the General Assembly. 
Although the Red Notice is not formally binding, simply being the 
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subject of a red notice can deprive individuals of freedom of movement, 
result in detention, or imprisonment. Countries will often make a 
provisional detention or arrest and then evaluate the evidence, as Russia 
and Italy did for Kazhegeldin (Savino 2010, 7).10 The assumption of due 
process is inherent to Notice procedures, following from the requirement 
that an authorized judicial body must issue a warrant for arrest. Interpol 
cannot assess, however, if the warrant was issued in good faith, and if 
judicial body itself is apolitical. 
This combination of elements has not gone unnoticed. The partisan 
nature of the General Assembly, which is entitled to the last word on red 
notices; the de facto power of a notice to affect individual liberty; and the 
intentional limits on Interpol’s ability to assess the validity of the 
accusation or the legitimacy of the accusing body—can have significant 
consequences for the cases Interpol handles. How these issues are dealt 
with will denote trends in the active development of procedures for 
responsibility and accountability in international governance.11 
 
Wither Sovereignty? 
“Wither sovereignty” declared a blog post in late 2009 on 
ThreatsWatch, the online presence of the “Center for Threat Awareness” 
(Schippert and Middleton 2009).12 The title made the needling suggestion 
that the authority of the United States to govern itself was shriveling away. 
The blog reported that President Obama had authorized Interpol, a non-
American law enforcement agency, to investigate and arrest citizens, 
while at the same time making their archives inviolable, thus exempting 
them from subpoe- nas, Freedom of Information Act requests, or access to 
their offices by American law enforcement. This would of course hold 
dark implications for citizens, but the deeper conspiracy was that this was 
the first step of a plot by President Obama to prosecute officials from the 
prior Bush administration for war crimes, ultimately with an eye to 
turning them over to the International Criminal Court in The Hague. 
The story was picked up by Newt Gringrich, who shared it with a 
much wider audience in a January 4th 2010 television appearance on Fox 
News’ The O’Reilly Factor. 
 
The president recently signed very quietly an executive order that 
basically releases Interpol from all American constraints. Freedom of 
Information Acts don’t apply. All the constraints that you as a citizen 
could use against an American police force, based on a recent Obama-
signed executive order, give Interpol, which has relationships with Syria, 
with Libya, with Iran . . . What I’m told is that it could lead to a number 
of investigations by Interpol in the United States, potentially aimed at 
American officials. 




Outrage spread rapidly in an online and print community that is 
characterized by the way it finds evidence of conspiracy against America 
(the nation, rather than the government). Horrified commentators ranging 
from film and TV star Chuck Norris to lawyer and conservative columnist 
Andy McCarthy at the National Review exhorted the American public to 
pay attention, to protest that the president had signed away significant 
elements of US sovereignty, and the rights of citizens were in danger. 
However fantastic their assumptions about what the Executive Order 
meant—indeed, these were completely removed from reality—both in 
their fantastical nature and in foregrounding the issue of sovereignty, they 
were representative of the suspicions with which Interpol has been 
regarded. 
The executive order in question (Obama 2009), signed on December 
16, 2009, was actually an amendment to President Ronald Reagan’s 1983 
Executive Order 12425 (Reagan 1983). Reagan’s order was issued in 
order for Interpol to hold its 1985 General Assembly meeting in New 
York (Billington 2010). Throughout the mid-twentieth century, FBI 
Director J. Edgar Hoover had jealously restricted American involvement 
in Interpol. After his death in 1972—and in the wake of increased 
terrorism in the 1970s, and Interpol’s help in extraditing alleged 
terrorists—the United States began increasing its Interpol staffing and 
financial contributions. Reagan designated Interpol a public international 
organization under the International Organizations Immunities Act (IOIA) 
so that the meeting could be organized and held on US soil, but withheld 
certain privileges. The reasons for the limitations in Reagan’s order at the 
time were uncomplicated: 
 
Since Interpol does not have an office or staff in the United States, and 
there- fore has no property, assets, archives, or permanent employees 
located in the United States, several of the specific privileges, 
exemptions and immunities available under the IOIA may be 
inapplicable or irrelevant to Interpol. 
Noble (2010) 
President Clinton removed the restrictions on one clause related to 
taxes in 1995 (Clinton 1995); no one paid any attention. Obama removed 
the rest of the restrictions, so that Interpol was fully possessed of the 
rights of an international organization in the United States. Obama took 
this step because Interpol had opened a new office in New York in order 
to collaborate with the United Nations. Despite ThreatsWatch claims, the 
status of “international organization” applied only to the New York office, 
not to the National Central Bureau housed in the Washington, DC, 
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Department of Justice (Billington 2010). “[T]he executive order gives 
Interpol no law- enforcement or investigative powers to engage in 
activities on U.S. soil,” the Secretary General of Interpol wrote in a 
January 2010 Op-Ed in Newsweek aimed at countering the conspiracy 
outrage, such as “searches, seizures or arrests in the U.S.” Politifact, a 
fact-checking project by the Florida-based St. Petersburg Times, provided 
a point-by-point rebuttal (2010). 
 
Interpol doesn’t have police powers to abuse. It can’t arrest anyone, and 
it doesn’t conduct investigations. And even if it did, the organization’s 
con- stitution bounds it to operate “within the limits of the laws existing 
in the different countries.” The only relevant law Obama’s executive 
order waives covers search and seizure, and that right can be reclaimed if 
the president deems it necessary. 
Analyses that came to the same conclusion were produced on all sides, 
from the National Rifle Association (2010) to The New York Times 
(Savage 2009) but were rejected by Gringrich and his ilk. The Secretary 
General’s explanatory editorial in Newsweek was also ignored or 
dismissed by those intent on finding a conspiracy. 
Their outrage, however misplaced in this instance, is revealing. The 
idea of “police” implicit in the 2010 uproar over the executive order is that 
of an instrument of a sovereign state (Foucault 2008, 1–25). The intrusion 
of what were presumed to be Interpol’s police powers was therefore taken 
as a direct affront to national sovereignty. In practice, a nation’s police 
powers of surveillance or detention or arrest usually cross borders by 
means of a bilateral treaty, and are carried out by the police of another 
nation. The relationship is inter–national, between the two parties. Less 
frequently Interpol acts as one party, when treaties do not exist or while 
the person’s location is unknown, for example. In a bricolage typical of 
global policing, notices can be thought of as legally “parasitic,” in that 
they draw their force from other legal texts, including bilateral agreements, 
domestic law criminalizing an act for which someone is sought, 
extradition treaties, or occasionally international human rights law 
(Savino 2010, 41). 
Interpol, however, has neither the powers nor the objective of 
sovereignty over the collected member nations. Rather, its commitment is 
to “collective security” (Noble 2009a). This is a rhetorical framing which 
nonetheless can be understood as a form of action which emerges from the 
complex objects and subjects that constitute Interpol. Global policing 
works through a combination of technologies (databases, meetings, 
Notices, etc.) to cross national boundaries, and requires “the possibility of 
movement, change of place, and processes of circulation of both people 
and things” (Foucault 2007, 71). The diverse 
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produces its version of “collective security” are not made exceptional 
(Waever 1995) or an organizing principle of everyday life (Bajc 2011), 
but they are linked together, preserving their diversity and motion. 
 
“Violent Crime Commonly referred to as Terrorism” 
When a plane from Czechoslovakia was hijacked in 1951 and landed 
on a US airbase in West Germany, Interpol issued Red Notices on behalf 
of the Communist government (Sheptycki 2004). Objecting that the 
hijack- ing was a political, not criminal act, FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover 
withdrew US law enforcement from participation in Interpol. At the next 
General Assembly, a resolution was passed implementing a standard of 
predominance, which declared that Interpol was restricted by Article 3 of 
its constitution from assisting with “offenses of a predominantly political, 
racial or religious character” even if these pertained to common crimes 
(INTERPOL 1951). This was gradually reinterpreted over the course of 
the 1970s via resolutions allowing Interpol to cooperate on matters 
pertaining to hijacking and hostages, which could jeopardize general 
public safety (Deflem and Maybin 2005). These changes were still not 
open-ended enough for Interpol to act after the Black September attacks at 
the Munich Olympics in 1972, despite widespread international 
opprobrium of the events. In the 1980s, Interpol refused to send Notices or 
even “clear information about Nazi war criminals due to the perceived 
‘political’ content of this information, and [the sense] that these types of 
cases ultimately fell outside their area of competence” (Barnett and 
Coleman 2005, 608). 
Interpol risked obsolescence by not assisting member states in their 
counterterrorism efforts. In recognition of this, in 1984 the organization 
passed two resolutions that gradually shifted terrorism from a sore point to 
the central directive it has become within its global mission. The first 
resolution placed “violent crime commonly referred to as terrorism” 
within the organization’s mandate by linking it to ordinary law crimes. 
(INTERPOL 1984a). The second, “Application of Article 3 of the 
Constitution,” resolved that while a criminal act would be assessed as 
predominantly political or not on a case-by-case basis, a violent political 
act outside a “conflict area” did not count as political, meaning Interpol 
could likely address “foreign” terrorism in Europe or the United States 
(INTERPOL 1984b). 
In 1998, Interpol issued guidelines and a declaration that, in a further 
definitional gambit, divided terrorist acts into their criminal components, 
rather than evaluating the motive or the ends used as justification. The 
1998 governance documents built upon something akin to the notion that 
an act is criminal when it “offends strong and defined states of the 
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collective conscience” (Durkheim 1997, 40). Interpol, attempting to 
appeal to, and even create, such a collective conscience, presented the 
justification that such acts were a danger “to the State of Law, to 
democracy, and to human rights” (INTERPOL 1998). When the events of 
September 11, 2001 took place, Interpol was primed to pass a resolution 
declaring the acts a “crime against humanity” (INTERPOL 2001). The 
previous internal prohibition against counterterrorism was wholly inverted 
as a mandate to participate, justified in the name of Interpol’s 
constitutional directive to act “in the spirit of the ‘Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights’ ” (INTERPOL 1956; Bassiouni 2002). 
Secretary General Noble began his incumbency eager to raise the pro- 
file and increase the acting power of the organization under him. Even 
before 9/11, he had directed Interpol to prepare for “24/7” staffing at 
headquarters, which was then fortuitously positioned for roll-out, with 
terrorism as a strategic rationale. At the first post-9/11 assembly, Noble 
announced reorganization and a proposal for making “the issuance of Red 
Notices for terrorists the highest priority” (Noble 2001). In 2002, the 
database for stolen, counterfeit or forged identify documents was 
launched.13 In 2005, the Interpol–UN Security Council Special Notice was 
created to notify member nations about individuals and entities subject to 
sanctions imposed by the United Nations Security Council. 
In June 2007, UK Prime Minister Gordon Brown directed that terror- 
ism be redefined as a crime problem. “Let us be clear,” said home 
secretary Jacqui Smith, “terrorists are criminals, whose victims come from 
all walks of life, communities and religions” (Rieff 2007). This distancing 
from “war on terror” rhetoric, which would occur slightly later in the 
United States, was not empty, but rather allowed counterterrorism to be 
aligned with counter-crime police work. For Interpol, it meant a higher 
profile for the role it was already exercising with its publicly searchable 
Red Notice gallery and promotion of UN Security Council agreements. 
Indeed, Interpol’s participation in counterterrorism has been successful in 
two ways. One is in its traditional niche of facilitating others’ actions, and 
in so doing, also shaping them. The other is in providing a forum to 
display the actions that governments want made public, which even a 
“wanted notice”—by definition not yet a security success—serves to 
announce. In contrast, Noble’s efforts to create an antiterrorism 
intelligence task force and flashy operational support such as the 
Command and Coordination Centre (Noble 2007d, Interpol 2012b) have 
fallen flat. Interpol cannot be considered an important player in these 
aspects of counterterrorism; nations may be interested in including 
Interpol in their arsenals, but not by conceding clandestine forms of action 
such as intelligence. 
As the Heads of NCBs meeting continued, some of the country 
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representatives postured and debated; many worked on their computers or 
phones, or spoke quietly to people seated nearby. Eventually, the 
bioterrorism program director gave his 15-minute update to the assembly. 
We passed out the questionnaires, received back a disappointingly small 
number, and returned to our fortress headquarters. 
 
International and Global Policing 
By providing an interface for information sharing, a venue for 
publicity, infrastructure support, best practices, and trainings, Interpol 
alters practices of local, national, and regional policing, and international 
governance, and, iteratively, its own. Clearly, the effects of Interpol’s 
global policing are not felt everywhere, nor are they homogeneous. They 
ramify beyond the delimiting feature of knowledge work augmented by 
techno- logical improvements, and its political-legal framework. 
One axis of seemingly inevitable transformation is funding. Interpol 
has moved to reduce the importance of statutory contributions from 
member nations by obtaining grants from entities interested in subsidizing 
specific efforts (Noble 2008).14 The organization sought funding from the 
Sloan Foundation to start a bioterrorism prevention program (Olsiewski 
2007). Equipped with $4,500,000 (Alfred P. Sloan Foundation 2009, 68), 
the program provided regional trainings on bioterrorism preparedness, and 
ran the briefly lived “biocriminalization” project where I worked. 
Promoting biocriminalization meant that I catalogued laws nations had 
already drafted and/or passed, criminalizing acts such as the possession, 
transfer, or transport of “dangerous biological agents and toxins.” The 
project added Interpol to the ranks of NGOs engaged in similar tasks 
around legal frame- works. The aggregation of laws that criminalize or 
regulate chemical and nuclear weapons, for example, may eventually 
mean, in a patchwork but effective fashion, that there are “global” crimes. 
The largest single funding block to Interpol to date, however, has been 
from the international governing body of football (soccer), FIFA, with a 
donation of US$20 million to counter match-fixing (Interpol 2012b). The 
final total for a cybercrime complex in Singapore, still under construction, 
will presumably be higher. As Interpol diversifies its financing beyond 
statutory member dues (Noble 2011), the ability to influence its activities 
will increase. 
Other forms of police action and cooperation are of course shaping 
and contributing to global policing. Europol, for example, has been 
engaged in the unprecedented development of transnational policing with 
some supranational authority.15 Law enforcement agencies such as the 
New York Police Department and the US Department of Justice’s FBI and 
Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), use a widespread system of 
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liaison officers (Wirtz and Sullivan 2009). United Nations Police, which 
are member nation units deployed for the UN, are active in conflict areas, 
and often have the right to use force (United Nations 2013). When first 
dispatched in the 1960s, their powers were extremely limited, but since 
2000 they have a mandate to reform and restructure local police forces, in 
addition to advisory, training, and monitoring tasks.16 
Table 9.1 lays out schematically the distinctions described in the 
previous sections, between international and global policing as carried out 
by Interpol. Cooperative investigations, stings, and manhunts, enacted 
through bilateral agreements directly between countries (Gerspacher 2008, 
181), still formalize and facilitate the majority of police operations 
involving crimes across borders, or crimes committed in more than one 
country, such as drug trafficking from producer country to consumer. The 
well-established practices of international policing have provided crucial 
elements for the less settled assemblage of global policing. Global 
policing enables and is complementary to the stable processes of 
cooperation. 
Table 9.1 Comparison of International and Global Policing at Interpol 
Mode of police 
cooperation 
International policing (traditional 




Early 1900s, largely “high/politicized” 
policing of anarchist movement; 
protection of elites’ interests (thieves and 
swindlers at Monaco casinos, theft of 
Austrian jewels recovered in France) 
Return of politicized policing with 
increased pressure from al-Qaeda 
terrorist network 1990 onward, 
accelerated after 9/11 
Rationale 
 
Perception of increasing crime (after 
World War II); 
Functional differentiation between 
internal and external security; 
Cold War; 
Crime as issue of national security 
(transnational organized crime) 
Conceptualization of threats as events 
that emerge rapidly, unpredictably 
Neither threats nor security are 
territorially bound 
Terrorism as a crime, the global pursuit 
of which is made public by 
governments in order to show their 
effort  
Actors Seconded officers who do work that may be unrelated to their expertise; lawyers 
Permanent staff (lawyers, officers) with 
expertise in a crime area (environment, 




A network of connections between equal 
nodes: country NCBs; the unit is the 
nation 
A flexible assemblage of heterogeneous 
elements—for some of which the unit is 
the nation, for others not 
Purpose Maximize efficient police response to crimes and pursuit of perpetrators 
Use information on circulating people 
and things to increase preparedness for 
crimes and other potential events 






Complex criminal conspiracies 
Corruption, economic crime, drug 
trafficking, organized crime 
Complex criminal conspiracies that 
threaten the state/are seen as state 
concerns 
Shared existential and/or moral threats: 
terrorism, environmental crimes, human 
trafficking, child pornography 
Technologies  
Notice system 
Messages concerning criminals and 
crime 
Standardized in categories red, blue, etc. 
“administration of communication 
systems”  
Data exchange systems and technical 
support (e.g. I-24/7, mind and find) 
Operational support (e.g. Incident 
Response Teams) 




Suspects, perpetrators, those wanted for 
crimes, fugitives: individuals 
Networks (of terrorists, human 
traffickers, drugs) 
Pre-crime (proven involvement in 
terrorist group, although mere 





National interests/individual rights 
Dual/double criminality (mutual 
recognition between nations of an 
offense) 
Human rights 
Universal humanity, standards 
Funding Statutory contributions 
Targeted contributions from countries 
and organizations toward specific goals; 
grants 
 
Stalcup, M. Interpol and the Emergence of Global Policing. (2013) Policing and Contemporary 
Governance: The Anthropology of Police in Practice. ed. William Garriott, New York: Palgrave 
MacMillan. 
International and intergovernmental organizations have near-
immunity from prosecution, in order that neither a state nor an individual 
can cripple its action. However, as organizations such as Interpol produce 
what is increasingly considered global governance, through their acts, or 
by providing the means for action with determinative repercussions for 
local life, courts have become more willing to hear cases against them 
(Cheah 2012, 378–380). Remedial bodies have been established by 
Europol, the UN Security Council, and Interpol, in order to preemptively 
foreclose lawsuits by offering an alternative course of action for 
individuals with a grievance. Wui Ling Cheah suggests that this represents 
the process of legalization, narrowly defined as a specific form of 
institutionalization and self-governance featuring “the adoption of rules 
that are legally binding, precise and enforceable through dispute 
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resolution before independent third-parties” (Abbot et al. 2000; Cheah 
2010, 33). For Interpol, this independent remedial body is the 
Commission for the Control of Interpol’s Files (CCF). Together with the 
messier discussions in annual meetings, regional conferences, legal 
evaluation of notices and diffusions, and press releases , the Commission 
now plays a distinct role in Interpol’s self-governance practices. However, 
the CCF can ultimately only advise. Decision-making power (about access 
to files or Notices) rests with the General Secretariat, and ultimately with 
the General Assembly.17 
Marion Fourcade comments that it is “one thing to point to 
transnational institutions, communities, and actors and to show that they 
generate distinctive outcomes (e.g., the diffusion of norms about human 
rights or economic policies). It is quite another to show how their very 
existence relates to broader patterns of social and economic 
transformation” (2006, 152). The development of Interpol’s position on 
terrorism and its role in countering it, for example, were part of a post-
9/11 bandwagon, yet global policing, although it advanced by these means, 
cannot be reduced to it. Terrorism served as a strong justification for 
change in the organization; however, the way that Interpol redefined 
terrorism as well as how it redefined itself in relation to clusters of issues 
has resonance with other global phenomena in the world today. As 
McKeon noted, “We have not had much practice on a world scale in the 
kind of cooperation that substitutes confidence in ideas as expressions of 
reasons for suspicion of ideas as cloaks for unexpressed reasons 
underlying proposed action” (1948a, 578). In as much as global policing 
has proceeded through the development of policies, protocols, and shared 
practices—and at Interpol this has been the primary mode of 
development—it seems no closer to settling for member constituencies 
how to resolve philosophical differences (on human rights, crime, or 
terrorism); yet it does present an instructive case in which a political 
frame has been sought for common action. 
 
Notes 
1. According to the Interpol press office, recent speeches and comments by 
the Secretary General, “can be seen as official statements of INTERPOL 
policy” and will be treated as such in this chapter. See 
http://www.interpol.int/News-and-media/Media-room/Information-for-
journalists, accessed 4 May 2013. 
2. Interpol began electronic record-keeping in 1972 (Cheah 2012, 386) but 
used Morse Code to communicate until the latter half of the 1980s, when it 
switched to email (Sheptycki 2004, 116).  
3. Similarly, Wirtz and Sullivan distinguish between international policing 
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and “global metropolitan policing” (2009). “In international policing,” 
they write, “national police organizations served as the conduit for sharing 
information among foreign law enforcement agencies.” In global 
metropolitan policing, “local police forces are developing and sharing 
expert ‘systems of knowledge’ with fellow professionals across national 
boundaries,” which can include “national and metropolitan law 
enforcement agencies as well as linkages with intelligence organizations, 
non-governmental organizations, and private and corporate security 
entities.” They exclude Interpol from this “metropolitan” version of global 
policing, however, whereas I argue that Interpol is better viewed as a 
significant embodiment of global policing, shaping in specific ways even 
the metropolitan elements. 
4. In the terminology I use, Interpol is part of the global policing assemblage, 
which is more dynamic (less settled and stable) than the overall global 
police cooperation apparatus. See Rabinow (2003, 54–56) for an in-depth 
differentiation of apparatuses and assemblages.  
5. On that history, in addition to those references listed in this text, see 
Deflem (2002); Fooner (1989); Gerspacher (2008); Nadelmann (1993).  
6. Finnemore and Troope(2001,749) describe legitimacy in law as deriving 
from a number of interrelated sources, including “attention to internal legal 
values.” They add, “law is legitimate only to the extent that it produces 
rules that are generally applicable, exhibit clarity or determinacy, are 
coherent with other rules, are publicized (so that people know what they 
are), seek to avoid retroactivity, are relatively constant over time, are 
possible to perform, and are congruent with official action.” Arguably, 
although lacking a treaty, Interpol has attempted legitimacy by treating its 
founding documents along these same lines.  
7. In the United States, for example, in 1938 and then again in 1958, 
Congress authorized the Attorney General to accept and maintain 
membership, along with dues payable to Interpol (22 U.S.C. 263). See 
Schermers, HG and Blokker, NM, International Institutional Law: Unity 
within Diversity. Boston, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers (2003) para 36, 
cited in Martha (2010), 194.  
8. The UN Secretariat seems to leave itself some room to maneuver if 
challenged, in that its acceptance of an instrument for registration does not 
confer “the status of a treaty or international agreement if it does not 
already possess that status” (Michel 2011). Interpol refers to itself, 
however, as an “intergovernmental organization” (INTERPOL 2010c).  
9. In addition, see the Fair Trials International, which lists Shahram 
Homayoun, Rasoul Mazrae, Ilya Katsnelson, and Akezhan Kazhegeldin, 
among others.  
10. See Savino’s 2010 article for a much more in-depth accounting of the 
implications of Interpol’s Red Notices. Additionally, nations will 
sometimes provisionally detain an individual on a Diffusion, or when a 
notice only requested information (such as a Blue Notice to locate/identify 
a person of interest in a criminal investigation).  
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11. See, for example, the Institute for International Law and Justice at New 
York University School of Law http://www.iilj.org/GAL/.  
12. The Center for Threats Awareness is a think tank with 501(c)3 tax-exempt 
status.  
13. Convincing countries to fill that database remains a challenge; see Noble 
(2007d).  
14. For information on Interpol’s finances, see Interpol (2012b, 51): “For the 
financial year 2011, INTERPOL’s operating income totaled EUR 60 
million, of which 84% was contributed by member countries, mostly in the 
form of statutory contributions (83%). Income received on externally 
funded projects or from private foundations and/or commercial enterprises 
with similar objectives or interests to INTERPOL constituted 13 % of 
gross income. Other income and reimbursements made up 3% of the total.”  
15. There is a large body of literature concerning Europol, its unique 
development, and special status. See, for example, Deflem (2010); Fijnaut 
(1992); Gerspacher (2005, 2010); Marenin (2005); and Pocar (2004).  
16. Alice Hills suggests that the problem with UN police is that “efficient 
policing” means very different things in different places. Normative 
proposals for a global “constabulary ethic” (Sheptycki 2010) seem to 
assume that “effective and democratic policing are synonymous” (Hills 
2009, 304), when in fact efficient policing can mean the violent 
perpetuation of a non-democratic and repressive regime. Hills argues that, 
although a subset of the policing literature may assume that police officers 
“share a distinctive outlook in the world,” constituted by “a set of 
assumptions, values, modes of thinking and acting,” or a “consensus on 
what is necessary for effective policing,” there is not yet an “operationally 
meaningful transnational policecraft” (ibid.). Regardless, Interpol, in that it 
is not a police force, would seem unlikely to share that craft or ethic, 
despite its own rhetoric.  
17. Under Article 18 of the Rules on the Processing of Data, individuals do 
have the right to request access to the information concerning them 
processed by Interpol (2012a, 12) but by those same rules (Article 135), 
regardless of what the independent advisory Commission for the Control 
of Interpol’s Files advises, the final decision has to be taken by the General 
Assembly.  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